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ALTHOUGH there have been articles treating the problems arising in.
connection with the trial of antitrust cases when tried civilly,' there appear
to be none dealing with criminal antitrust trials under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.2 The reason for this lack of legal comment upon the subject may
be that, although the Sherman Act is basically a federal criminal statute,'
the Government, through the Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus-
tice, has preferred to carry on most of its litigation arising under the Act on
the civil rather than the criminal side of the court;4 only in cases where the
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CASES ON RECORD. He served as chief de-
fense counsel for The Glidden Co. in the
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paid fines. Only two of the corporate defend-
ants, Glidden and du Pont, stood trial. The
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Government deems the
violations as most flagrant
has it apparently sought
relief on the criminal side
of the court by way of in-
dictment or information.
This reluctance on the
part of the Government to
enforce the antitrust laws
by means of criminal prose-
cution, rather than the
more common method of
merely requesting an in-
junction to restrain the al-
leged illegal acts, could well be attributed to the increased difficulty of
proving the Governmenes case in a criminal proceeding with a jury as
triers of fact. Not only is the admissibility of evidence in such a case more
severely restricted than in a court of equity where the chancellor judges on
'McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV.
L. REV. 27 (1950); Prettyman, Needed: New Trial Technique, 34 A.B.A.J. 766
(1948); Whitney, The Tral of an Antitrust Case, 5 NEW YORK BAR ASSOCIATION
RECORD 449 (1950).
2Note, 13 GEO. WAsH. L REv. 434 (1945) deals with some threshold questions
arising in criminal antitrust cases but does not discuss trial procedure.
'See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401, 24 Sup. Ct. 436,
468 (1904). (Holmes, J., dissenting).
'When the antitrust laws are violated, the Department of Justice has the choice of
instituting either a civil or criminal proceeding. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4.
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Wis. 1938).
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questions of fact as well as law, but in addition, as in other criminal cases,
to obtain a conviction the Government must convince all twelve jurors of
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.5 An examination of the
supplementary table of cases, which has been prepared from the "Blue Book"
compiled by the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of
Justice,' evidences that the Antitrust Division has apparently been success-
ful in obtaining guilty verdicts in only a little more than one half of the
crimnal antitrust cases litigated.7
During the first 61 years in which the Sherman Antitrust Act has been
in effect, less than 125 criminal antitrust cases arising under the Act have
been prosecuted to a verdict or decision." There have been, on an average,
only two cases tried to a verdict or decision per year. This is understandable
when one realizes what is involved by way of preparation, both for Govern-
ment and defense counsel, in a typical antitrust case involving charges either
of conspiracy or monopoly, or both, under the Act.
Antitrust cases arising under the Sherman Act have been labeled as
"big cases,"9 and with ample justification, for oftentimes the lawyers at-
tempting to defend against the Government charges are compelled to de-
vote months, and sometimes years, in preparation for trial. Thii task of
preparation is of utmost importance for in most instances the type of evi-
dence which will be introduced in support of the indictment or information
is such as to involve the corporate history of the defendants over many years.
Although the cutoff date beyond which the Government will offer no evi-
dence relating to the charges of a continuing conspiracy necessarily varies
with the case, there have been allegations in some litigated antitrust cases
that relate to background events of over 60 years.10 To counter and explain
such background events upon which the Government attempts to establish
"a conspiracy in restraint of trade" within the meaning of the Sherman Act
demands prolonged investigation on the part of defense lawyers, who must
'Far. R. CR. P. 31(a). Cf. United States v. Crescent-Kelvan Co., 164 F.2d 582
(3d Cir. 1948).
aTsB FEDERAL ArrusT LAws: 1890-1951 EDrIO N (CCH 1952).
'See Supplementary Table of Cases mfra.
'Dismissals or disposition on motion, demurrer or plea - including pleas of guilty,
,zolo contendere, etc., have been omitted from the Supplementary Table of Cases.
'McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems it Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARv.
L. REV. 27 (1950) A civil antitrust case, United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) is the longest in Anglo-Saxon jurispru-
dence. There were 58,000 pages of testimony, 153 witnesses and over 1800 exhibits.
However, United States v. Cement Institute, Civ. No. 1291 (D. Colo. 1945) which
involved a multiple basing point system in the cement industry runs a dose second,
with some 49,000 pages of testimony and almost 50,000 pages of exhibits.
" E.g., United States v. Western Electric Co., Civ. No. 17-49 (D. N.J. 1949) (back-
ground events going back as early as 1876); C. United States v. United Shoe Ma-
cune Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (Mass. 1950) (complaint covered 35 years of corpo-
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acquaint themselves with all of the probable events transpirng during the
time wherein the continuing conspiracy is alleged to have taken place. In
short, as long as the courts will permit the Government to introduce evi-
dence to reveal background events in an effort to establish a continuing
conspiracy, such antitrust cases, whether tried civilly or criminally, will be
viewed as "big cases:'
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss all of the problems arising
in the preparation and trial of a criminal antitrust case. Only some of the
highlights will be dealt with.
PRE-TmA.L THmSHOL QUESTIONS
The Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts
fail to provide the court with any right to compel counsel on either side to
submit to a pre-trial conference. Unlike the procedure usually followed
in civil nonjury antitrust cases," the trial court presiding over a "big case"
when tried criminally can only suggest a pie-trial conference to counsel, and
if counsel refuses to consent, the trial of the case will begin without the
benefit of such a conference.12  Inasmuch as this type of case, whether
tried criminally or civilly, is usually a documentary one involving literally
thousands of exhibits,13 a pre-trial conference wherein counsel for the
parties have agreed to follow Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
rate history); United States v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Cr. No. 12789, (W.D. Pa.
1951), CCH TRADE Rr. P~m. 66,012.
In United States v. I. L du Pont Co., General Motors Co. and United States
Rubber Co., Civ. No. 49 C 1071 (N.D. Ill.), CCH TRADE REG. Rm,. 66,050,
counsel for General Motors in their pre-trial brief stated that it is "unusual not only
because it is basically an attack upon big business - but also because it was necessary
for the Government to go back 150 years in order to weave its web of suspicion and
surmise." Wall Street J., Nov. 15, 1952, p. 2, col. 5.
SiED R. CIv. P. 16.
"As was observed by Judge Wallace S. Gourley on Oct. 8, 1951. "This [pre-trial)
proceeding, gentlemen, is somewhat novel as far as criminal actions are concerned.
When the Acting United States Attorney first presented the matter to me for the
purpose of assignment, and I made reference to the indictments, the thought crossed
my mind that possibly we might expedite the actual trial of this proceeding if it
could be approached in the nature of a pre-trial hearing in the first instance.
"I personally have used pre-trial procedure in all civil actions, and I have found
it to be very practical and expeditious in administering justice. I realized that there
was no legislative authority or any rule of the Supreme Court which would authorize
such procedure as a matter of law. I believe most of you are aware that I did com-
municate with counsel of record for the respective parties and suggested that a
stipulation be entered into by counsel in which a request for a pre-trial conference
would be made to the court or that a written request be made to the court request-
ing a pre-trial conference." United States v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Cr. No. 12789
(W.D. Pa. 1951), CCH TRADE REG. REP. q 66,012, p. 3 of transcript.
"B.g., United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) (3,700 exhibits); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp.349 -(Mass. 1950) (4,166 exhibits); United States v. New York Great Atlantic &
19 53
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should be seriously considered. In most criminal antitrust cases where such
a pre-trial conference has been consented to, the trial proper has usually
been a more orderly one. This is especially true when one realizes that a
jury of twelve with alternates (usually four additional jurors) sit in judg-
ment on such a case. If counsel consent and effectively use the pre-trial
procedure offered by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
subsequent trial can be shortened by weeks, if not months, and can run
much more smoothly, thereby benefiting not only the court and the jury but
also counsel for both sides.
When an indictment is returned or an information is filed in a criminal
antitrust case, defense counsel are confronted at the very outset with one
of the same problems which generally arises in a civil antitrust suit filed by
the Government. How certain is defense counsel of knowing that any or
all of the documents obtained by the Department of Justice are available to
him? If such documents were obtained from, or belonged to, the defendant,
or were obtained from others, either by seizure or process, provision is made
in Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to enable defense
counsel to file a motion to examine or obtain copies thereof at any tune
after the indictment was returned or information filed. The court may
order the attorney for the Government to permit the defendant's counsel "to
inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or
tangible objects obtained from or belonging to the defendant," provided
there is a showing that the items sought may. be material to the preparation
of the defense and that the request is a reasonable one. Rule 16 further
provides that the court's order shall specify the tune, place and manner of
making the inspection and of making the copies or photographs.
This power of inspection and copy by defense counsel extends to docu-
ments taken from others only if such were taken by seizure or by process.' 4
The real trouble arises when defense counsel attempts to inspect and obtain
copies of documents which have been obtained by the Government from
Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. 11. 1946) (7,000 exhibits); United States
v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (1,400 exhibits); United
States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1942) (3,300 exhibits);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(1,803 exhibits). In the "Patnt" case, United States v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Cr.
No. 12789 (W.D. Pa. 1951), CCH TRADE REG. REP. 66,012, before stipulations
cut the number down, there were about 5,000 prospective exhibits numbering over
8,000 pages. In supposedly the biggest of all antitrust trials, United States v. E. I.
du Pont Co., General Motors Co. and United States Rubber Co., Civ. No. 49 C 1071
(N.D. Ill.), CCH TRADE REG. REP. 66,050, out of some 100,000 documents col-
lected, some 1,200 are reported for trial use. Time, Dec. 8, 1952, p. 87, col. 1.
'Umted States v. Rainey, 10 F.R.D. 431 (W.D. Mo. 1950). For the rule in civil
cases see FED. R. Civ. P. 34. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee,
CCH TRADE CAsas (1948-1949) 62,479 (W.D. La. 1949), 4Pd, 339 U.S. 940,
70 Sup. Ct. 793 (1950)
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the defendant he represents or from others neither by seizure nor by process.
Conscientious defense lawyers are anxious at the outset to know whether
they have copies of all of the documents taken not only from their own
dient but from others, whether named as parties defendant, co-conspirators,
or otherwise. But where the Government obtained the documents from a,
defendant or "from others" who voluantarily gave up their documents, there
appears to be no relief afforded defense counsel whereby discovery and in-
spection of the documents can be made.' 5 There have been, however, in-
stances where the Government has been willing to furmsh copies of docu-
ments taken neither by seizure nor by process. Whenever government
counsel so consent, defense counsel do not have the anxiety of wondering
whether copies of all of the documents taken are available to them for pur-
poses of preparing for trial.
The next serious question confronting defense counsel in this type of
case is whether the indictment or information is subject to dismissal. In
order to ascertain whether the indictment or information sufficiently in-
forms the accused so that it may proceed to trial knowing exactly what there
is to meet factually," it is necessary to analyze thoroughly the Government's
pleading. It is the exception rather than the rule for the court to grant a
motion to dismiss,'7 but assuming that the defendant has pleaded "not
guilty" at the arraignment, it behooves. defense counsel to exhaust every
available motion before trial.'
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for mo-
tions to dismiss, as distinguished from demurrers and motions to quash
which have been abolished. In a motion to dismiss, any defense or ob-
jection which is capable of determination without the trial of the general
issue m ry be raised before trial, and all defenses and objections available to
the defendant based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in
the indictment or information, other than that it fails to show jurisdiction
in the court or to charge an offense, must be raised before trial Otherwise,
these latter defenses and objections will be considered to have been waived.
However, pursuant to Rule 12 (b), of the criminal rules, the court may
grant relief from such waiver for cause shown. Lack of jurisdiction or
'United States v. Rosenberg, 10 F.LD. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v.
Chandler, 7 F.R.D. 365 (Mass. 1947).1 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation " U. S. CONST. AMEND. VI. Rumely
v. United States, 293 Fed. 532 (2d Cir. 1923).
'Universal Milk Bottle Service v. United States, 188 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1951);
United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 137 F.2d 459 (5th
Cir. 1943); United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. La. 1949).
'Cf. Harris v. United States, 104 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1939); see United States v.
Krupnick, 51 F. Supp. 982, 988 (N.J. 1943).
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failure of the indictment or information to charge an offense s, of course,
never waived. Rule 12 makes it mandatory for the court to take judicial
notice, sfun sponte "at any time during the pendency of the proceeding," of
,such lack of jurisdiction or failure of the indictment or information to
charge an offense.
Since offenses arising under the Sherman Act may be punished by im-
prisonment for a term not in excess of one year or payment of a fine not
in excess of $5,000, or both, 9 at the discretion of the trial court, alleged
offenses may be prosecuted either by indictment or by information.2" Rule
7(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure so provides, and section
(c) of the rule provides that the Government's pleading must be "a plain,
concise and definite written statement of the essential facts consuuting the
offense charged" signed by Government counsel. However, it need not
contain either a formal commencement, a formal conclusion or any other
matter not necessary to such statement. But the indictment or information
must state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute,
rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged
therein to have violated. Yet omission or error in the citation is not ground
for dismissal of the indictment or information if the error or omission does
not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.
Although bills of particulars were abolished by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in the trial of civil cases and in lieu thereof a motion for
more definite statement was substituted,2 ' the trial court presiding over a
"big case" tried crimnally may direct the government to file a bill of par-
ticulars pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
However, defense counsel must file their motion for a bill of particulars
within ten days after arraignment or at such other time before or after ar-
raignment as may be prescribed by court rule or order. Defense counsel
engaged in trying criminal antitrust cases should not overlook this type of
motion, especially when there is any doubt as to what is meant by any of
the allegations of the indictment or information. Though courts have ap-
peared reluctant to grant such motions to toto, they have at times caused the
government to particularize in certain respects. 2  Usually when such a
-15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2.
" 'With but a few exceptions all the criminal prosecutions instituted under the
Sherman Antitrust Act have been commenced by grand jury indictments. This
course has not been followed under constitutional compulsion; prosecutions under
the act may be instituted by information." Lewin, The Conduct of Grand jury
Proceedings mn Antitrust Cases, 7 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 112
(1940). The use of indictment rather than information has tl e advantage for the
Government of the opportunity to use the grand jury power of subpoena. See Note,
13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 434, 451 (1945)
FED. R. CIv. P 12 (e)
"United States v. Allegheny County Retail Druggists' Ass'n, 12 F.R.D. 249 (W.D.
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motion is orally argued, it becomes necessary for counsel to specify in derail
the various allegations which appear to them to be ambiguous. Some courts
hearing a motion for a bill of particulars take the view that when the plead-
ings are sufficiently responsive as to enable defense counsel reasonably to
prepare their defenses the motion should be dened.23
Another threshold question to be considered seriously by counsel de-
fending in a "big case" tried 'criminally involves the taking of depositions.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure covers this. At any
time after the indictment or information has been filed, defense counsel
may move the court for an order that a deposition be taken of a prospective
witness if it appears that such witness may be unable to attend the trial,
provided that defense counsel can also show that the prospective witness'
testimony will be material, so that without which there would be a failure of
justice. At the same time and place, any designated books, papers, docu-
ments and tangible objects, not of a privileged nature, can also be produced
pursuant to court order. The manner provided in civil actions governs the
taking of a deposition in a criminal antitrust case, and the trial court may
order the deposition taken on written interrogatories if the defendant so
requests. There is no provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
enabling Government counsel to take depositions, and this is properly so;
otherwise, such a provision would be unconstitutional since the defendant
has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 24
Depositions taken by defense counsel in a "big case" when tried crimi-
nally can be used under Rule 15(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure at the trial or upon any hearing if it appears that the witness who
gave the deposition is dead, out of the United States (except when the
absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition)
or unable to attend or testify because of sickness or infirmity, or if the party
offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the
witness by subpoenaY As in the trial of a civil case, any deposition taken
by the defendant may be used in a criminal antitrust case by any party for
the purpose of either contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the
Pa. 1952); United States v. Kelly, 10 F.R.D. 191 (W.D. Mo. 1950); see Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 66, 62 Sup. Ct. 457, 463 (1942); United States v.
Tarpon Springs Sponge Exchange, 142 F.2d 125, 127 (5th Cir. 1944).
'United States v. Mangiaracina, 10 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo. 1950); United States
v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 9 FR.D. 69 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
' "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him "' U.S. CONsT. AMEm. VI. Motes v. United
States, 178 U.S. 458, 20 Sup. Ct. 993 (1900).
' "It was contemplated that in criminal cases depositions would be used only in
exceptional situations, as has been the practice heretofore." Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules, FED. R. CR. P. 15(e), 18 U.S.C.A. p. 222.
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deponent as a witness; and if only a part of the deposition is offered in evi-
dence by a party, Rule 15(e) empowers an adverse party to require him to
submit in evidence all of the deposition which is relevant to the part offered.
Any party may offer other parts, and objection to receiving in evidence a
deposition or part thereof may be made as provided in civil actions.
A trial court must be "educated" during pretrial and trial so that the
judge will be conversant with the exhibits in order to enable him to pass on
the problem of proof. If the parties in a criminal antitrust case agree to a
pre-trial conference,26 the lawyers who have completely familiarized them-
selves with the case by reason of their many hours of thorough preparation
can enable the judge prior to trial to obtain a better grasp of the tremendous
mass of documents, the admission of which will possibly be in issue. It is
during this pre-trial stage that a "big case" involving, in most cases, thou-
sands of documents can be simplified to a very large extent for, where pre-
trial conferences are agreed upon, opposing counsel as well as the court
literally think out loud in the absence of the jury as to how the tangled mass
of documents can be reduced and molded into manageable form so as to be
more easily handled during the trial. Ordinarily, Government counsel,
even in criminal antitrust cases, are co-operative to the extent of at least ap-
prising defense counsel of the main documents upon which they rely to
make a prima facze case. Often times at a pre-trial conference, disputes as
to authenticity, relevancy or identity of documents can be settled by stipula-
tion between counsel, thereby solving not only certain procedural details
but perceptibly cutting down the length of the trial.
The usual practice on the part of defense counsel who are entrusted with
the defense of a criminal antitrust case is to have the documents taken by the
Government investigators from the respective defendants copied in quad-
ruplicate, then indexed and cross-indexed alphabetically, chronologically,
and as to persons and places or events. Where the documentary data taken
from defendants runs into thousands of pieces of paper, obviously the cost
of indexing alone is enormous.27 But that is only the start. Some one or
'This procedure was followed in United States v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Cr. No.
12789 (W.D. Pa. 1951), CCH TRADE REG. REP. I 66,012.
' In the trial of United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 85 F. Supp. 349 (Mass.
1950) the marking and description of over 4,500 Government documents consumed
five days. Later, thirteen days were spent by defense counsel arguing over 15,000
objections to over 4,000 of the proffered exhiuits. The Government's exhibits num-
bered about 4,600, and at least eighteen different types of objections were made
by the defense.
A comment by trial Judge Wyzanski is worthy of note: "Counsel cannot dump
into the lap of the court an undigested mass of documents comprising hundreds of
thousands of pages and then expect the court to read all of them, even if they were
all to some degree both relevant and persuasive. It will be enough for the court
to emphasize the point that it is counsel's duty and not the court's to read all the
[Winter
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more of the defense battery of lawyers (and there are usually more than one
in such a case) must become thoroughly acquainted with the documents.
Likewise, some one must examine the documents with a view to identifica-
non, authentication, genuineness, relevancy and so forth.
Rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tends to simplify
the handling of such documents in a civil case. Under it there may be de-
termined the genuineness of any relevant documents and the truth of any
relevant matters of fact set forth in a request and served upon a party. How-
ever, the rule becomes ineffective when the various defendants are unwill-
ing to reply to the request for authentication. They are not required under
the rule to respond to such a request, and therefore, in that instance, the
Government is obliged to produce witnesses in court to identify and au-
thenticate the documents. If the direct testimony of such witnesses is
limited in those respects, defense counsel have no right to examine them
on any other subject. Under Rules 16, 26 and 27 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure somewhat the same procedure is to be followed.
Although the criminal trial of a "big case" is much more limited than
the civil trial of such a case, the present attitude of trial judges handling
the preliminary matters in a criminal antitrust case brought under the
Sherman Act seems to follow somewhat the same liberal treatment that is
employed by trial judges hearing civil antitrust cases. Even in a criminal
case, in handling the voluminous mass of documents presented in most pre-
trial conferences, the courts are deeply influenced by the liberality of prac-
tice which fairly breathes from the pores of the Sherman Act.
A "big case" when tried civilly or criminally is quite frequently the
result of much investigation -by the F.B.L on behalf of the Antitrust Di-
vision of the Department of Justice, and Government counsel usually places
considerable emphasis on documents discovered through such investigation.
However, in criminal antitrust cases the Government, realizing that jurors
are impressed by live witnesses, does not often limit the evidence in its case
to documents. Astute Government prosecutors handling this type of case
will supplement the documentary evidence with the testimony of individuals
so as to make their case more impressive. Such was done in the 'Tobacco"
case"8 and in the "Pa t ' case." Thus, it behooves opposing counsel to
available exhibits and then to make a usable selection. One judge cannot read in a
reasonable time exhibits which it has taken a multitude of counsel, dividing the
work among themselves, years to collect, especially when it is transparent that not
all of the lawyers taken together have read even a fraction of the thousands of
patents and like exhibits." United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 62,631
CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1948-1951).
'American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 328
U.S. 781, 66 Sup. Ct. 1125 (1946).
'United States v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Cr. No. 12789 (W.D. Pa. 1951), CCH
TRADE REG. RaP. 66,012.
19551
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prepare their defense by using live-witness testimony. It stands to reason
that, if the Government puts in a large mass of damaging evidence in the
form of documentary proof and supplements it by having witnesses take the
stand to confirm the position taken by the Government, unless defense
counsel meet that evidence with live witnesses as well as documents, the
jury will be inclined to favor the Government. Therefore, as a part of the
preparation to be engaged in by defense lawyers, there must be included
the job of locating, examining and briefing witnesses for trial.
TRIAL PROPER
Comparatively few criminal antitrust cases which have been filed seem
to ever reach trial. Up to 1952, less than 125 cases were actually tried to a
verdictor decision. Most of them appear to have been settled before the
trial date by an entry of a plea of nolo contendere and the payment of fines.
This is ordinarily done because most individuals and corporations who are
indicted for having violated either Section 1 or 2 or both of the Sherman
Act 0 do not regard it as prudent to spend considerable time and money in
vindicating their position, even though they may be completely innocent.
A defendant is required to weigh the practicalites of the situation, having
in mind the tremendous expense of such litigation if the case is carried
through to a conclusion. I venture to say that only infrequently does a de-
fendant have the intestinal fortitude as well as financial means 1 to stand up
and litigate the charges brought by the Government under the Sherman Act.
No one knows how gargantuan and herculean the defense task is other than
counsel who have actually defended their clients in such a cause. The easy
way out on the part of one charged by the Government with having violated
the Sherman Act is to make a settlement by way of signng a consent decree
(if civil) or pleading nolo contndere (if criminal) and avoid the re-
sponsibilities which attach to the trial of such a case. Although settling of
the case without trial in this manner seems more prevalent when the action
is brought civilly than when a criminal charge is filed, it is like a breath of
fresh air to counsel learned in this type of case to have a client who will
stand up and fight to the bitter end.3
2
'0 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
' According to the Pre-trial Order No. 2 and Memorandum of Judge Medina in
United States v. Henry S. Morgan, Civ. No. 43-757 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1950), the
cost to the defendants for a comprehensive compilation of all relevant facts on se-
curity issues of any importance, from the 1935-1949 period alone, was stated to have
been not less than $350,000. McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems so
Attrust btgaton, 64 HARV. L Rrsv. 27, 50 (1950).
" A popular magazine commented editorially on this problem which was present
in the "Paint" case: "The Glidden president, Dwight P. Joyce, said the case cost his
firm more than $100,000 in fees and other expenses. We may assume that the bill
[Winter
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The empanelling of the jury is governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and by United States District Court rules adopted by
the respective courts. In some jurisdictions, the clerk in the absence of the
trial judge interrogates prospective jurors. In others, the judge does the
questioning and when counsel wishes to supplement his questions, he must
do so by addressing the judge. If the judge believes that counsel's ques-
tions are pertinent, he may put them to the prospective juror. In still other
jurisdictions, the prospective jurors may be interrogated by counsel. The
question of choosing a jury is of utmost importance and counsel should
not underestimate this phase of the proceeding.
Under Rule 24(b) and(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
each sde in a criminal antitrust case is entitled to three peremptory chal-
lenges for the regular panel and two for the alternate jurors, and, in the event
there is more than one defendant, it is discretionary with the trial court as
to how many additional peremptory challenges the defense will have. In
the "Pawt" case, the trial court allowed to the two defendants collectively
six peremptory challenges for the regular jurors and two peremptory chal-
lenges for the alternate jurors. Thus the number of peremptory challenges
will vary with the case depending upon the number of defendants and the
discretion of the trial judge.
As for, challenges for cause, which are limitless in number, the trial
court has the duty under statute3 s to determine whether such challenges
should or should not be granted. The principal grounds for challenge for
cause as of right are: (1) that the prospective juror does not have the
qualifications of a juror;3 4 (2) that the prospective juror is exempt from
jury service by statute;35 and (3) that the prospective juror has served as a
petit juror within one year previously 8
presented to DuPont was no less. Mr. Joyce said, 'It was well worth the $95,000
difference (between Glidden's costs and the other defendants' fines) to take the
stigma off the company s name.' Yet it seems a pity that there is such a high price
attached to the disproving of what, according to a Pittsburgh jury, were unfounded
charges. It also seems a pity that seven companies had to risk the stigma of inferred
guilt simply because they couldn't afford to pick up the tab." Colliers, March 15,
1952, p. 98.
1328 U.S.C. § 1870.
" "Any citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 21 years and resides
within the judicial district, is competent to serve as a grand or petit juror unless:
(1) He has been convicted in a state or federal court of record of a crime punish-
able by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been
restored by pardon or amnesty. (2) He is unable to read, write, speak and under-
stand the English language. (3) He is incapable by reason of mental or physical
infirmites to render efficient jury service. (4) He is incompetent to serve as a
grand or petit juror by the law of the State in which the district court is held."
28 U.S.C. § 1861.
'528 U.S.C § 1862.
m28 U.S.C. § 1869.
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There are also certain challenges for good cause addressed to the dis-
cretion of the trial court3 7 (sometimes referred to as challenges for favor),
such as where actual bias or prejudice is shown, 8 where there has been a
prior admission of bias or prejudice3 9 or where the prospective juror has
formed a fixed opinion concerning the issues involved.40 In addition, the
court may excuse any person or group of persons called as jurors upon find-
ing that their serving as such will entail undue hardship, extreme incon-
venience or serious obstruction to, or delay in, the fair and impartial ad-
ministration of justice.41
Once a panel of jurors is chosen, counsel on behalf of the Government
must make their opening statements, which may be followed by opening
statements of defense counsel for their respective clients or such may be
made after the Government has rested its case.42 The opening statements
of defense are also not to be minimized. Defense counsel should decide then
whether the placing of the jurors in a better position for evaluation of the
Government's testimony by informing them at the commencement of the
trial as to the contentions of the defendant or defendants will be more likely
to lead to a successful defense than any possible surprise to the Government
that may be produced by the evidence which the defendants intend to
produce. This decision should be based upon a thorough knowledge, not
only of the defendants' evidence, but, if possible, of the nature of the Gov-
ernment's evidence. If the jurors can understand the position which your
client takes at the outset of the trial, even though the proceeding lasts many
months, it is quite possible you have made headway.
In some cases filed in outside jurisdictions, the Government may bring
from Washington, D. C. as many as five, sometimes ten, lawyers to help
present its case. Defense counsel in turn may employ an equal number or
more,43 but it has always seemed unwise to the writer to have more than
"28 U.S.C. § 1863 (a).
'Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 70 Sup. Ct. 519 (1950).
'United States v. Fries, 3 Dall. 515 (U.S. 1799).
"Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Medley v. United States, 155
F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 873, 66 Sup. Ct. 35, rehearing
denied, 329 U.S. 822, 67 Sup. Ct. 35 (1946).
4128 U.S.C. § 1863 (b)
""Opening to the jury by both sides before any testimony has been introduced,
though a common practice in some state courts, is unusual in federal courts." Savitt
v. United States, 59 F.2d 541, 542 (3d Cir. 1932).
"In United States v. B. 1. die Pont Co., General Motors Co. and United States Rubber
Co. when trial began before United States District Judge LaBuy (N.D. Ill.) on
November 18, 1952, "three trial tables were occupied by the small army of 33 at-
torneys for the various defendants." Wall Street J., Nov. 19, 1952, p..3, col. 1.
The number of counsel for the defendants eventually came "to a staggering 63."
Life, Dec. 6, 1952, p. 41, col. 1.
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two defense lawyers present at the trial table. If there is more than one
defendant, counsel representing each of the defendants should insist upon
occupying separate trial tables. The reason for this is fairly obvious. If
the charge is one of conspiracy, members of the jury might easily misinter-
pret the fact that the defense lawyers are sitting together at the same trial
table throughout the trial as indicative of a conspiracy on the part of their
clients. However, where there is a battery of lawyers representing, .for
example, one corporation, it is best for that group to have one lawyer speak
on its behalf and take charge of the proceedings for that particular client.
These practical aspects are very important and should not be overlooked
by trial counsel Even to fraternize in or near the courtroom with counsel
representing an alleged co-conspirator might be interpreted by some one
sitting on the jury to mean that a conspiracy exists among defense counsel
and, therefore, among the defendants they represent.
In the trial of a civil antitrust case there apparently is no real distinction
between pre-trial and trial. Usually the judge conducts the pre-trial con-
ferences, presides at the trial and acts both as the court and jury. However,
when a "big case" is tried in a criminal court where the jury is not waived,
there is a distinct difference between pre-trial and trial. The jury which
is to try the facts must be made acquainted with the issues and evidence, for,
even though the court has learned what the issues are at the pre-trial con-
ference, the handling of such litigation to a condusion before a jury requires
counsel to bear in mind that the jury has had no prior knowledge of what is
involved. One starts "from scratch" and though the pattern of presentation
may have been simplified by reason of stipulations made prior to trial, the
entire matter is absolutely new to the jurors and must be developed step by
step for them. The usual method employed by Government counsel in such
cases is to introduce such documents as have not been agreed upon as to
identification and authenticity by putting on the stand witnesses who will
give testimony so as to identify and authenticate the particular documents.
With respect to these documents that have not been so stipulated, arguments
as to their relevancy, etc-, follow by counsel, usually in the absence of the
jury, and thereafter the court rules 4 sometimes reserving his ruling on the
admissibility dependent upon the introduction by Government counsel of
other testimony by way of connection. This phase of the Governments
presentation is usually cut and dried. Defense counsel whose documents are
involved are usually very much on the alert, and counsel whose clients'
""In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The admissibility of
evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except
when an Act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience." FED. R. CR. P. 26.
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documents are not involved generally "take a back seat." Following the
identification and authentication of documents come the Governmentes
live witnesses as to events and it is then that all defense counsel should be
"on their toes." Cross-examination of such witnesses is governed by a rule
laid down by the courts to the effect that counsel are limited in their cross-
examination of witnesses as a matter of right to subject matters brought
out by such witnesses only on direct examination. 45
In the trial of a civil antitrust case based upon alleged Sherman Act
violations, the Government has the right to introduce incriminating data
taken from the files of the defendant corporations which evidences or tends
to evidence a conspiracy, as for example, alleged price-fixing." In such
civil litigation, the defendant has no right to introduce, by way of defense,
testimony which will negative this incriminating data. Defense testimony
to that effect is considered incompetent as self-serving evidence." How-
ever, when a "big case" is tried on the criminal side of the court and docu-
ments tending to show the state of mind of the defendant have been ad-
mitted in evidence, the trial court should permit the defendant to meet such
damaging data taken from its files by introducing testimony which will
negative the Government's contentions. By way of example, in the "Pan"
case, tried in Pittsburgh, the court admitted a letter in evidence, over objec-
tion, as against the corporate defendant whose officer had written the let-
ter to an officer of another corporate defendant.48  The letter, which had
'Alpin v. United States, 41 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1930); Foster v. United States,
178 Fed. 165 (6th Cir. 1910).
"Cf. Lewis v. United States, 38 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1930); Browne v. United
States, 290 Fed. 870 (6th Cir. 1923); United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 784 (E.D.
Ga. 1906).
'
t United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1949); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1944).
WIGMORE, EviDmcE § 1048 (3d ed. 1940).
"Government's Exhibit No. 1 in part read: 'We fully realize that under today's
conditions, and generally at all times, any change in wage rates, hours, working con-
ditions or employee relations which this Company may adopt, may have a very ma-
terial and perhaps serious effect on our competitors, both friendly and otherwise,
and our industrial neighbors at our plant locations. We are convinced that any ill
effect of our action upon neighbors is bound to react against ourselves; hence we
wish to make every effort, and our plant managements have been so advised to, if
possible, let our neighbors, competitive or otherwise, know in advance what we are
doing in these respects, why we are doing it, and when. By adopting this policy,
we do not undertake to adjust ourselves to the views of others, we do not ask or
imply any intended agreement on the subject, and reserve the right to act absolutely
independently. What we do intend to do is, see that our action does not injure
someone else because of its timing or unexpected nature."
This letter was admissible as against the other defendants as co-conspirators only
after the conspiracy and its membership had been established by other evidence.
United States v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Cr. No. 12789 (W.D. Pa. 1951), CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 66,012, p. 416 of transcript.
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been neither signed nor sent, was admitted as relevant in tending to show
the requisite state of mind necessary to prove a criminal conspiracy in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act 49 However, the defendant could have rebutted
this evidence by having the officer who wrote the letter take the stand and
testify as to his actual state of mind.
Conducting the defense of a criminal antitrust case, though involving
a greater number of witnesses and a huge amount of documentary data, is
similar in some respects to the way an ordinary criminal case is handled. As-
suming that the court has refused to grant the defendant's motion for judg-
ment of acquittal at the close of the Government's case," defense counsel are
then charged with the duty of presenting their respective cases and Rule
29(a) expressly empowers the defendant to "offer evidence without having
reserved the right" so to do.51 Usually counsel representing the defendant
first named takes the lead unless there has been an agreement otherwise.
The primary effort on the part of the defense is to refute what has been
brought out by the prosecution. This is done by introducing whatever
evidence is available to controvert the government's claims.
Usually, defense counsel will endeavor not only to negative the evidence
introduced by the Government but also to establish affirmative defenses
beneficial to their clienes cause.
Affirmative evidence which explains certain business practices in-
dulged in by the defendant during the period involved may also be offered.
If this part of the case has been properly prepared, trial aids covering the
precise points relative to affirmative defenses make handy references for
use at time of trial.
It is customary for defense counsel to renew their motions for judgment
of acquittal at the dose of their defense and again after rebuttal when all of
the evidence is in and all parties have rested. Pursuant to Rule 29(b) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court may reserve this
decision on the motion for judgment of acquittal, submit the "big case' to
the jury and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict, or
after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned
a verdict. As in the trial of civil cases, if the trial court demes the motion
and submits the case to the jury, defense counsel may renew the motion
within five days after the jury is discharged.
"Cf. Lewis v. United States, 38 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1930); Browne v. United States,
290 Fed. 870 (6th Cir. 1923); Chadwick v. United States, 141 Fed. 225 (6th
Cir. 1905).
"FED. R. CR. P. 29(a) abolished motions for directed verdict and substituted in
lieu thereof motions for judgment of acquittal.
"FED. IL CR. P. 29(a).
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REuTrAL AND SuRREBuTrAL TErmoNY
Government counsel sometimes deem it wise to establish when investi-
gation by the F.B.I. first began, so as to be in a position later to argue to the
jury that the documents introduced by the defendants' counsel, which were
written or created after the investigation began, should be viewed with sus-
picion by the jury. To meet this, it is submitted that defense counsel should
be permitted to put on the stand by way of surrebuttil the individuals who
wrote those particular letters so as to establish that at the time they were
written, their authors did not know of such an investigation.
This precise and novel question was before Judge Gourley who presided
over the "Pait" case. He ruled that if the Government counsel had the
right to introduce testimony concerning the date when the investigation first
began, then, in turn, the corporate defendant whose rights were involved
should be permitted to show by way of defense the circumstances under
which such data was created. This seems to be the only fair rule to apply
in order to show the true state of mind of the defendant, despite the fact
that whatever evidence might be introduced on surrebuttal might appear to
be self-serving.
Any party may file written requests, either at the close of the evidence
or at such earlier time during trial as the trial court reasonably directs, that
the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. Adverse
parties are entitled to be furnished with copies of such requests, and it is
mandatory upon the court to inform counsel of its proposed action upon the
requests before arguments are made to the jtury.5 2 In that way, the court's
instructions on certain phases of the law, can be anticipated in advance of
the charge by the court. This usually enables counsel to make an effective
oral argument on the basis of being able to predict accurately what the judge
will say when charging the jury. Of course, the court does not instruct the
jury until after the arguments of counsel are completed.
FINAL ARGumENT AND CHARGE
If opposing counsel properly co-operate with the trial court during the
trial of the case, they can prove of great assistance in the drafting of the
charge to the jury. Very few trial lawyers realize what an enormous re-
sponsibility is placed upon a trial court charged with the proper handling
of such a case. Obviously the lawyers who have participated are usually so
conversant not only with the facts but with the law that they realize it is
asking a great deal of the court to educate a jury of laymen to the point that
they understand the various theories involved in and the many issues making
up a "big case." The least that can be done by both Government and de-
'2 FkM R. CE. P. 30.
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fense counsel is to co-operate to the fullest extent with the trial court so
as to enable him to charge the jury fully and fairly on all questions involved.
The court's charge to the jury is often necessarily of very great length.
However, despite the length of the charge and the amount of time con-
sumed by the trial, it is always unwise for counsel to bore the jury by arguing
too long. The writer has known of some cases in which counsel have taken
literally days in which to argue to the jury. The most effective argument,
it seems to me, is one that can be made in a few hours. Of course, the time
needed for final argument will generally depend on the number of issues
involved. The more simple the argument is, however, the more under-
standable it becomes. Defense counsel should naturally stress in their final
arguments the duty of the jurors to return a verdict of guilty only if they
have an abiding faith to a moral certainty that the evidence adduced at trial
clearly convinces them beyond all reasonable doubt that the charges made
were true. This presents a great handicap for Government counsel in this
type of case and, because of this reason alone, may cause the Department of
Justice to institute more antitrust cases civilly than criminally."
Recent charges given by United States District Courts in antitrust cases
which appear to be most inclusive and representative are those given by
Judge Ford in the 'Tobacco" case, 5 Judge Goodman in the "Drid Frot
Assocwuson" case," and Judge Gourley in the "Paint" case. 7 Unless counsel
objects specifically to any portion of the charge or to omissions therefrom
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, "stating distinctly the matter
to which he objects and the grounds of his objection," he cannot assign it
as error. s
CONCLUSION
The foregoing article is not intended to be exhaustive of the subject.
It has been written because, in the author's opinion, there appears to be a
dearth of material concerning the criminal trial of what is known as a "big
case." This appears to be so even though less than one hundred and
twenty-five of such cases have actually been tried to conclusion during the
first 61 years of the Sherman Act.
" In the "Paint" case the charge covered over one hundred pages and consumed more
than three hours of the courts time.
"See note 5 supra.
"American Tobacco Co. v. United States, Cr. No. 6670 (E.D. Ky.), aff'd, 147 F.2d
93 (6th Cir. 1944), 328 U.S. 781, 66 Sup. Ct. 1125 (1946).
"United States v. Dried Fruit Ass'n of California, 4 F.R.D. 1 (1944).
"United States v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Cr. No. 12789 (W.D. Pa. 1951), CCH
ft"nn REG. REP. 66,012.
RFmD. R. Ca. P. 30.
For example, the problems of unpounding of documents, proof of official records,
venue and motions to transfer have been omitted from this article.
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The Government is precluded from appealing such a case if it loses in
the trial court Therefore, it behooves defense counsel to win below, if
possible. Usually, the "big case" when tried criminally is an uphill fight for
Government counsel because a unanimous verdict of all twelve jurors is
needed to convict a defendant 6
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE OF CASES
The following are criminal antitrust cases instituted by the United States
(1890-1951) arising under the Sherman Act which were prosecuted to a
verdict or decision (dismissals either by the Government or by the court,
or disposition on motion, demurrer or plea- including pleas of guilty,
nolo contemdere, etc., are excepted).
Jury
gree
1895 United States v. Moore
1906 United States v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes




Meat & Produce Co.
United States v. Santa
Rita Store Co.
1907 United States v. Corbert
Stationery
United States v. Union
Pacific Coal Co.
1908 United States v. Ray
United States v. Ameri-
can Naval Stores
1909 United States v. Ameri-
can Sugar Refin-
ing Co.
1910 United States v. Steers
United States v. Swift Co.
United States v. Stand-
ard Sanitary Mfg. Co.
1911 United States v. Pearce
United States v. Hunter
Milling Co.
1912 United States v. Patterson
Disa- Found


























Information Jury Disa- Found Find
Filed greement Guilty Not Guilty Disposition
1914 United States v. Knauer x
United States v. Irving x
United States v. Rocke-
feller 5 6
1915 United States v. King x
United States v. Boyle x
United States v. Artery x
United States v. Rintelen x 3
United States v. Bopp x
United States v. Cowell x
1917 Uited States v. Jensen
Creamery Co. x
United States v. Aileen
CoalCO. x
United States v. Webster x
United States v. Barton Directed
Verdict
United States v. Belfi x
1920 United States v. Colgate Directed
& Co. Verdict
1921 United States v. Atlas
Portland Cement Co. x Dismissed
United States v. Andrews
Lumber & Mill Co. x Affirmed
1922 United States v. O'Brien x
United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co. 43 3 Affirmed
United States v. Clements x
United States v. Williams 5 1
1924 United States v. Reilly x
1925 United States v. Fitz-
gerald x
United States v. Berkey &
Gay Furniture Co. x Dismissed
United States v. Auls-
brook & Jones Furm-
ture Co. x Dismissed
1927 United States v. Baum- x Rev. in
gartner Part
1928 United States v. Wallace x Dismissed
United States v. Greater
New York Live Poul-
try Chamber of Com-
merce 66 2






1931 United States v. Merc
1933 United States v. Fish
Credit Ass'n, Inc.
United States v. Wet
United States v. Prote
Fur Dressers Corp
United States v. Need
Trades Workers In
dustrial Union
United States v. Fur
Dressers Factor Co.
1934 United States v. McG
(Feb. 28)
1935 United States v. War.
Bros. Pictures, Inc.
1936 United States v. Gran
United States v. Stari
ard Oil Co.
1937 United States v. McG
1938 United States v. General
Motors Co.
United States v. Local
807, Intl Brother-
hood of Teamsters
United States v. Ameri-
can Medical Ass'n








United States v. Central
Supply Ass'n
United States v. Associ-
ated Plumbing and
Heating Merchants
United States v. Kelly-
Goodwin Hardware
Coal, Inc.
United States v. Evans
Jury Disa- Foud






























United States v. Nick
United States v. Chatta-
nooga News-Free
Press Co.
United States v. Lumber
Products Ass'n, Inc.
United States v. U. S.
Gypsum Co.
United States v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co.
1941 United States v. Western
Washington Whole-
sale Grocers Ass'n
United States v. Beatrice
Creamery Co.
United States v. New
York Great A. & P.
Tea Co.
United States v. Dried
Fruit Ass'n of
California
United States v. Canners
League of California




United States v. Atlantic
Commission Co.
United States v. General
Electric Co.
1942 United States v. Virginia-
Carolina Clays, Inc.
United States v. Califor-
nia Retail Grocers &
Merchants Ass'n, Ltd.
United States v. Wiscon-
sin Cheese Exchange
United States v. Dubuque
Cooperative Dairy
Marketing Ass'n
United States v. St. Jo-
seph Stockyards Co.

























United States v. Dair
Cooperative Ass'n
United States v. Colt
bia River Packers
Ass'n, Inc.
United States v. E. I.
Pont de Nemours
& Co. (Aug. 10)
United States v. Kinj
& Co.
Jury Disa- Found









1943 United States v. Ozark
Canners Ass'n, Inc.
United States v. Halibut
Liver Oil Producers
United States v. Tarpon
Springs Sponge
Exchange
United States v. Millers'
Nat'l Federation
United States v. Middle-
west Motor Freight
Bureau
United States v. Spokane
Fuel Dealers Credit
Ass'n, Inc.
1944 United States v. New
York Great A. & P
Tea Co.
United States v. Eastern
Gas & Fuel Ass'n
1945 United States v. Ass'n of
Limb Mfgrs. of
America, Inc.
1946 United States v. Local 36
of the Int'l Fishermen
1947 United States v. National
City Lines, I'nc.
United States v. Armour
& Co.
United States v. National
Ass'n of Real Estate
Boards





























United States v. North
East Texas Chapter,
N.E.C.A.
United States v. Maryland
and Virginia Milk
Producers Ass'n
United States v. Happy
Valley Farms, Inc.
United States v. Sherwin-
Williams Co.
United States v. Denver
Master Plumbers
United States v. Con-
sumers Ice Co.
1949 United States v. Walter
Kidde & Co.
United States v. Church
Grape Juice Co.
United States v. Stern
United States v. Phila-
delphia Gas Works
1950 United States v. Atlantic
Co.
United States v. Blake,
Moffit and Towne
United States v. Healy
River Coal Corp.
United States v. Anchor-
age Cab Owners Ass'n
1951 United States v. Califor-
nia Rice Exporters
United States v. Las
Vegas Merchant
Plumbers Ass'n
The above table of cases is intended to
be entirely so.
Found Final













be all-inclusive. However, it may not
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